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Abstract 
We examine whether the inflation rates of the countries that pursue inflation 
targeting policies have converged as opposed to the experience of the OECD 
non-inflation targeters. Using a methodology introduced by Pesaran (2007a), 
we examine the stationarity properties 0f the inflation differentials. This 
approach has the advantage of avoiding setting arbitrarily a specific country as 
the benchmark economy. Our results indicate that the inflation rates converge 
irrespective of the monetary policy framework. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the late 1980s an increasing number of countries have adopted explicit 
inflation targets as a means for anchoring expectations and securing price 
stability. In addition to the theoretical research that establishes analytically 
the rationale for inflation targeting (e.g. Svensson, 2011), substantial evidence 
has been produced on the effects of inflation targeting on the inflation rate, its 
volatility, and output growth, focusing on both the time series and the cross 
sectional dimension. The results are far from conclusive, however, with the 
evidence upon the effects of targets on inflation being mixed. Extensive 
evidence has been produced emphasising the importance of targets in the 
reduction of both the inflation level and its persistence (e.g. Hyvonen, 2004; 
Johnson 2002, Levin et al., 2006; Lin and Ye, 2007, Goncalves and Salles, 
2008). Nevertheless, other analyses suggest that the declining tendency of 
inflation in several inflation targeting countries cannot be attributed to the 
inflation targeting (e.g. Ball and Sheridan, 2005; Ball, 2010; Genc et. al, 2007; 
Angeriz and Arestis, 2007b, 2008). 
Another line of research considers the process of inflation convergence 
across countries in a time series context among countries that may share the 
same policy regime (e.g. Busetti et al., 2007 consider European counties), or 
not (e.g. Crowder and Phengpis, 2007). The focus of this literature, however, 
is on inflation convergence and does not account for the implications of 
inflation targeting.  
In this contribution we consider whether the inflation rates in the 
inflation targeting and non-inflation targeting OECD economies converge 
using the pair-wise stationarity testing procedure of Pesaran (2007a) on 
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bilateral inflation differentials. We also employ some recently developed panel 
unit-root tests for robustness purposes that allow us to consider whether the 
inflation convergence process differs for inflation targeters and non-targeters. 
The results indicate that convergence is evident regardless of whether central 
banks announce explicit inflation targets or not. This evidence is in line with 
findings from earlier literature that employs different methodologies and 
indicates that the inflation targeting regimes by themselves cannot explain the 
improved inflation performance observed during the periods of inflation 
targeting (e.g. Ball and Sheridan, 2005; Angeriz and Arestis, 2008). Overall, 
this study contributes towards answering one of the key enduring questions 
about inflation targeting, namely whether the “improvements in performance 
observed in countries that have adopted inflation targeting [are] the direct 
result of the change in policy regime” (Bernanke and Woodford, 2005, p. 2). 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. The following 
section reviews the relevant literature on inflation targeting and on inflation 
convergence; it also provides the reasons behind investigating inflation 
convergence among the countries selected for the purposes of this 
contribution. Section 3 describes the econometric methodology. Section 4 
discusses the findings, and, finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes.  
 
2.  Background literature: Empirical Analyses of Inflation 
Targeting and Macroeconomic Performance  
A large number of studies have examined the effects of inflation 
targeting on macroeconomic performance. Early studies such as those of 
Neumann and Hagen (2002), Hu (2003), and Levin et al. (2004) find that 
  
3 
adopting inflation targets reduces both the average level and the variance of 
inflation. The contribution of inflation targeting in reducing inflation rates is 
corroborated by evidence suggesting that it has also been instrumental in 
reducing inflation expectations (e.g. Johnson, 2002; Johnson, 2003; Levin et 
al., 2004; Gurkaynak et al., 2008).   
Interestingly enough those positive results on inflation targeting 
performance do not seem to account for any potential cost of output. 
Furthermore, evidence exists showing an overall improvement in the growth 
performance of inflation targeters (e.g., Mollick et al., 2011). Moreover, the 
adoption of inflation targets appears to be associated with a reduction in 
output growth volatility (e.g. Goncalves and Salles; 2008).  
 More recent research outcomes, nonetheless, produce mixed results in 
terms of the impact of inflation targeting. A spate of papers suggests that 
inflation targeting has made a difference only in developing and emerging 
economies but not in advanced economies. Lin and Ye (2007) focusing on 
seven industrialised inflation targeters find that adopting inflation targets 
does not lead to the reduction of inflation and its variability. On the contrary, 
repeating the same analysis for thirteen developing inflation targeters (Lin 
and Ye, 2009), shows that the effect of inflation targeting in lowering inflation 
and its volatility is large and significant. The analyses of Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) and Walsh (2009) support further the proposition 
that inflation targeting seems to play a role in emerging markets but it does 
not matter in advanced countries. Angeriz and Arestis (2007a) consider the 
implementation of 'inflation targeting lite', i.e. the pursuit of inflation 
targeting by certain small emerging countries as a means of defining their 
monetary policy framework. The authors conclude that priority to inflation 
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targeting in relation to other objectives cannot be assigned in the case of ‘lite’ 
countries. 
The analysis of Ball and Sheridan (2005), who examine the effect of the 
IT adoption on the average level of inflation, poses a more fundamental 
challenge. Applying the ‘differences-in-differences’ methodology, Ball and 
Sheridan (2005) estimate the following equation  
 
post pre pre
i i i i ia bI c u                                                                           (1) 
 
where post
i  and 
pre
i  are the inflation rates after and before the adoption of 
inflation targets, respectively, iI  is a dummy that takes the value of one in the 
case of a country that is an inflation targeter and zero otherwise, and iu is the 
error term. Examining 7 inflation targeters and 13 non-targeters, they find 
that the IT dummy is statistically insignificant; that is, the reduction in the 
inflation rate takes place irrespective of the IT adoption. While the sample of 
Ball and Sheridan (2005) includes only advanced economies, Goncalvez and 
Salles (2008) extend the analysis to include emerging inflation targeter and 
non-targeter countries. Their evidence suggests that IT matters as the 
inflation targeters have experienced a greater drop in inflation rates than the 
non-targeters. 
Another set of evidence suggests that although inflation targeting has 
gone hand-in-hand with low inflation, the inflation targeting approach was 
introduced well after inflation had begun its downward trend. Angeriz and 
Arestis (2008) make this point and go further to apply intervention analysis to 
multivariate structural time series models to produce evidence for the OECD 
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countries, which suggests that after the adoption of the inflation targeting 
framework inflation is 'locked in' at low rates. However, the non-inflation 
targeting central banks appear to have also been as successful on this score.  
These findings are intrinsically related to the literature, which 
emphasises the issue of endogeneity of the monetary policy regime; that is, the 
dependence of the monetary policy regime on the whole nexus of economic 
policy decisions. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) and Gertler (2005) 
point out that the adoption of inflation targeting is only one part of an overall 
process of economic and political reform. Thus, the improvement of the 
macroeconomic performance prior to the August 2007 crisis, which is found 
to be related to inflation targeting, may not necessarily be due to the new 
monetary framework. Indeed, Angeriz and Arestis (2008) conclude that 
‘globalisation’ may be a better explanation of the improvement of 
macroeconomic performance referred to above.    
 Evidence on how the implementation of inflation targeting may have 
affected the process of inflation convergence is scarce. Ball and Sheridan 
(2005) interpret the statistically significant prei  on the right-hand side of 
equation (1) as evidence of convergence. This resembles to the notion of β-
convergence; greater reduction in inflation rates is achieved by countries that 
initially faced higher such rates. As argued above the fact that the IT dummy is 
found to be insignificant is actually an indication that inflation targeting does 
not account for the inflation convergence. Ball and Sheridan’s analysis is 
extended by Hyvonen (2004) who uses a larger number of countries and 
separates the time span into three sub-periods. The empirical evidence 
thereby produced suggests that inflation convergence still holds for the 
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extended grouping. Hyvonen (op. cit.) concludes that the observed inflation 
convergence is mainly due to the anti-inflation policies of the 1990s, which 
include inflation targeting as one of the alternative monetary policy 
frameworks adopted to achieve inflation reduction.  
Apart from these papers the literature on inflation convergence does  
not address the effects of inflation targeting adoption. Earlier studies 
examined whether the coordination of policies under the European Monetary 
System (EMS), aiming at common inflation goals, helped inflation rates to 
converge. Caporale and Pittis (1993) consider inflation convergence among 
EMS economies finding that the coordination of the exchange rate policies 
helped the convergence process. Westbrook (1998) results corroborate these 
findings for selected EMS countries.  After the creation of the Euro in 1999, 
the same question is rephrased. Busetti et al. (2007) also consider inflation 
convergence using two subsamples, 1980-1997 and 1998-2004. They find 
evidence of convergence only for the former period, while in the second period 
two subgroups emerge; one of low inflation countries and of relatively high 
inflation countries. The importance of non-linearities in accounting for 
convergence is highlighted by Gregoriou et al. (2011). Apart from the 
importance attached to inflation convergence in the context of coordinated EMS 
policies or a single monetary policy, some authors raise the question of inflation 
convergence among countries with different monetary policies. Becker and 
Hall (2009) address inflation convergence for a group of non-EMU Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries.  Kocenda (2001) also provides 
evidence of convergence of various macroeconomic variables, (including 
inflation) fundamentals among CEEs, while Kutan and Yigit (2004) challenge 
these results. Other studies consider advanced economies, as in Siklos and 
  
7 
Wohar (1997) who find that inflation rates converge across the EMU 
countries, US, Canada and Japan, but interest rates do not. Crowder and 
Phengpis (2007) produce similar results focusing on the G7 economies.  
Finally, a branch of literature shifts focus from  cross-country 
comparisons on regions of one or more economies Busetti et al. (2006) 
consider inflation in 19 Italian regional capitals, while Beck et al. (2009) 
examine regional inflation rates from 5 European countries. Finally, 
Yilmazkuday (2013) examines the disaggregated inflation rates for the Turkish 
economy before and after the adoption of inflation targeting in 2001.  
In this paper, we consider countries that have adopted inflation 
targeting and examine whether  inflation convergence among them is more 
pronounced as compare to non-inflation targeters.   Ball and Sheridan (2005) 
suggest that the disinflation achieved by inflation-targeting countries was due 
to their higher rate of initial inflation relative to other industrialised countries. 
In other words, they attribute the inflation performance of inflation targeters 
to the ‘regression to the mean’ or as Hyvonen (2004) puts it inflation 
convergence. More precisely, if there is no difference in disinflation between 
inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters one can dispute the role of 
inflation targeting in reducing inflation along the lines suggested by Ball and 
Sheridan (2005). The policy implication of such a finding could be that inflation 
convergence cannot be attributed to inflation targeting but should be viewed as a 
manifestation of the goals of monetary policy becoming more similar across countries 
(e.g. Hyvonen, 2004).   
We attempt to answer this question by focusing on a group of targeters 
and considering the performance of non-targeters as a control group. Our 
analysis is based on the examination of stationarity properties of the inflation 
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differential using the pairwise testing procedure (Pesaran, 2007a). To briefly 
illustrate our results we find that inflation convergence is true for both 
targeters and non-targeters, which suggests that the improved inflation 
performance over the period considered may not be an attribute of inflation 
targeting only.  
 
3. Empirical Methodology  
Stochastic convergence suggests that any difference between series that are 
temporary in nature will fade away in the long run with shocks dissipating 
over time (e.g., Bernard and Durlauf, 1995; 1996). More specifically, 
considering the inflation rate ( t ) for countries i and j convergence implies 
that: 
  
limℎ→∞ 𝐸(𝜋𝑖,𝑡+ℎ − 𝜋𝑗,𝑡+ℎ|𝐼𝑡) =0,                                                                    (2) 
 
where It denotes the information set at time t. A less strict definition allows for 
a nonzero constant as a limit and implies an equilibrium differential that 
remains constant through time. A direct implication is that stochastic 
convergence can be tested by examining the stationarity properties of the 
differential between the two variables, i.e. , , , ,i j t i t j td    . A commonly used 
approach focuses on the stationarity properties of this differential.  Typically, 
the differentials considered emerge from setting one country as the 
benchmark and focusing upon it. This approach, however, can be considered 
as arbitrary. If one wishes to analyze inflation convergence among developed 
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economies, there is no obvious reason for setting one specific country as the 
benchmark. In addition, the results can be sensitive to the choice of the 
reference country and the focus on only one possible dimension may lead to 
the loss of substantial information from the other combinations.  
Such issues, however, can be circumvented by using a pair-wise testing 
procedure developed by Pesaran (2007a), which takes into account all pair-
wise differential combinations. Let 
,i t  be the inflation rate for country i at 
time t, where i=1...N, t=1...T and , , , ,i j t i t j td     be the inflation differential of 
countries i and j at time t. The Pesaran (2007a) pair-wise approach is based 
on the examination of stationarity properties of all differentials of N countries 
without taking into account any benchmark. Instead, it considers the 
stationarity properties of all possible differentials between all countries under 
study. Specifically, the number of all differentials is N(N-1)/2.1 The fact that 
this methodology is based on the computation of all possible differentials, and 
not only on the differentials based on one benchmark, reveals its main 
advantage; that is, it provides additional information concerning the process 
of convergence.  
Suppose Zi,j,t is an indicator function that takes the value of one if the 
null of unit root is rejected at significance level a and zero otherwise. 
Specifically, Zi,j,t=1 when ADF(k)<Ca,k,T or Zi,j,t=0 when ADF(k)>Ca,k,T, where 
Ca,k,T is the critical value for size a, lag order k and T observations. Pesaran 
(2007a) shows that under the null of unit root (non-stationarity) the fraction 
                                                 
1 The number N(N-1)/2 is equal to the number of combinations of N per 2; in other words, 
(
𝑁
2
) =
𝑁!
(𝑁−2)!2!
=
𝑁(𝑁−1)
2
 
 
.  
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of differentials for which the null is rejected is equal to the significance level. 
Formally, this fraction is equal to: 
?̅? =
2
𝑁(𝑁−1)
∑ ∑ 𝑍𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑁−1
𝑖=1                                                                                     (3) 
 
and under the assumption that the null of unit root holds, we have: 
 
lim𝑇→∞ 𝐸(?̅?|𝐻0) =𝛼                                                                                               
(4)                          
 
In the case where convergence (i.e. stationarity) holds, the percentage of 
rejections tends towards 100% as the number of observations tends to infinity, 
i.e. T  . Consequently, the higher the proportion of rejections is, the 
stronger the evidence in favour of convergence. 
 We consider the stationarity of each differential through the use of unit 
root tests, including the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and the cross-
sectional ADF tests (CADF, hereafter), as developed by Pesaran (2007b). The 
ADF equation is written as: 
 
 
, , , , 1 , ,
0
k
i l t i l t l i l t l t
l
d a d d   

                                                                   (5) 
 
where , ,i l td  is the inflation differential of country i relative to country l at time 
t, Δ is the difference operator and k is the lag order. The inference is based on 
the t-statistic of the β coefficient. If β is not found to be statistically different 
from zero, then the series contains one unit root.  
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Given the fact that we consider all possible differentials, a potential 
problem that may be raised is that of cross-sectional dependence. The obvious 
dependence between , ,i l td  and , ,i f td  with l f  may induce problems in 
inference concerning the existence of convergence. So, the existence of 
dependence among the variables under study, i.e. among all the examined 
differentials, has to be detected. This is done by performing the cross-section 
dependence (CD) test proposed by Pesaran (2004). The first step is to 
estimate the ADF equation of the form (5) for each cross-section separately 
and compute the pair-wise cross-section correlation coefficients of the 
residuals from equation (5), i.e. ,ˆi j . The simple average of these coefficients 
across all the ( 1) / 2N N   pairs, ˆ , is equal to:   
?̅̂? = (
2
𝑁(𝑁−1)
)∑ ∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑁−1
𝑖=1                                                                                    (6) 
 
Using these calculations, Pesaran (2004) shows that the test:  
𝐶𝐷 = (
𝑇𝑁(𝑁−1)
2
)
1/2
?̅̂?                                                                                          (7)   
           
is normally distributed (see also Pesaran, 2007b, p. 297).  
Given the existence of cross-section dependence, the ADF test has to be 
modified. Pesaran (2007b) proposes such a modification according to which 
equation (5) is now rewritten as: 
 
, , 1 1 ,
0
k
i t i i i t i t l t l i t
l
d a d c d d d   

                                                           (8) 
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where 1
,
1
M
t l t
l
d M d

  is the cross-sectional average of all M differentials at time 
t. The inclusion of the average term, and its differences, takes into account the 
existence of dependence among variables. As in the standard ADF test, the 
inference about the unit root is based on the t-statistic of β coefficient. This 
statistic, however, does not follow either the t-student or the Dickey-Fuller 
ones. For this reason, specific and relevant critical values are provided by 
Pesaran (2007b).  
 The above pair-wise testing procedure draws on unit root tests applied 
on a single series of inflation differentials sequentially and the inference is 
based on the aggregate behaviour of these individual tests. As a robustness 
check to the pair-wise approach, we perform panel unit root tests for the 
examined differentials. That is, instead of looking into the time series 
properties of each differential, we now draw our attention to the whole panel 
of the series, which have the advantage of increased power.  
We employ panel versions of ADF and CADF tests.  In particular, we 
use the panel version of ADF proposed by Im et al. (2003) (henceforth, IPS), 
which constitutes a simple average of individual ADF unit root tests and has 
the following form: 
𝑡𝐼𝑃𝑆 =
√𝑀(𝑡̅−𝐸(𝑡𝑖))
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑡𝑖)
                                                                                  (9) 
 
where M is the number of cross-sectional units (here, differentials) and 𝑡̅  is 
the corresponding average, i.e. 𝑡̅ = 𝑀−1∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1 , with it  being the individual ADF 
t-statistic. The values of E(ti) and Var(ti) are computed through simulations 
by Im et al. 
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 The IPS test, however, does not take into account cross-sectional 
dependence. To overcome this shortcoming, Pesaran (2007b) incorporates 
cross-sectional means, as in the CADF test. In fact, performing for each single 
differential the CADF test, and taking the average values of the CADF t-
statistics, give rise to the following test statistic: 
 
tCIPS = M
-1∑ ti
CADFM
i=1                                                                                          
(10) 
                                                                                                   
                                       
where 
CADF
it is the t-statistic of the individual CADF tests and the subscript 
‘CIPS’ refers to ‘cross-sectional IPS’. Pesaran (2007b) provides critical values 
for this panel test. In fact the two panel unit tests are the average versions of 
individual ADF and CADF tests.     
 
4. Data and Empirical Results 
Our dataset consists of quarterly series of CPI from 1990:1  to 2011:4. All data 
come from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. From these 
series we calculate the quarterly annualised inflation as 4ln lnt t tP P   . 
According to Hammond’s (2012) classification, twenty-six economies have 
adopted inflation targeting with the New Zealand being the first economy to 
do so in December 1989. In the present study we focus on those economies 
that established the inflation targeting framework during the whole decade of 
the 1990s. In this way we exclude the economies, which officially adopted 
targets during the 2000s. Moreover, we exclude countries, such as the Czech 
Republic and Poland, due to lack of data despite the fact that they employed 
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IT during the 1990s. The included economies in our sample are shown in the 
upper panel of Table 1. The left column shows these countries and the 
corresponding dates of the adoption. According to the pair-wise analysis 
presented in the previous section, we analyse N=11 economies and we 
compute N(N-1)/2=55 pair-wise differentials.  
The analysis is repeated for a group of 11 OECD non-targeters (right 
column of Table 1). By testing the time series properties of differentials in each 
group, we are able to examine whether there is inflation convergence within 
each of the two groups, which differ according to the monetary policy regime.  
Apart from convergence within each group, it is of interest to explore 
any pattern of convergence considering both inflation targeters and non-
targeters as a single group; i.e. when the countries are grouped together 
irrespective of their monetary policy framework (N=22). In this way we can 
investigate the existence of inflation convergence among countries 
irrespective of the monetary policy pursued.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
 Since the group of 11 inflation targeters includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and South Korea, which introduced inflation targeting in the late 1990s, we 
also consider a narrower group that excludes these countries and consists of 7 
countries that adopted targeting in the early 1990s. The pair-wise convergence 
analysis is repeated separately for the narrower groups of 7 early 1990s 
inflation targeters and 7 non-targeters (lower panel of Table 1), as well as for 
the joint set, which includes the 14 inflation targeter and non-targeter 
countries.   
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Table 2 presents the results of pairwise ADF(k) tests for k=0,1,2,3,4.  
The first panel shows the percentage of rejections for the wide groups. As far 
as the inflation targeters are concerned, under the null of unit root (i.e. of no 
convergence), we expect the percentage of rejection to be close to the level of 
significance. At the 5% significance level the proportion of rejections ranges 
from 56.36% to 87.27%.  The range of rejection percentages is roughly the 
same when 10% is used as the level of significance. These results provide clear 
evidence of inflation rates convergence among inflation targeters.  
For the non-inflation targeters group, the findings are even stronger in 
terms of their support of the convergence hypothesis. When we use one, two 
and three lags in the ADF test, the percentage of rejections reaches 100%, as 
all the pair-wise differentials are found to be stationary at the 5% significance 
level. Consequently, within both groups inflation seems to converge. 
Unsurprisingly, inflation convergence is also supported for the joint set 
consisting of both inflation targeters and non-targeters. At the 5% level of 
significance, the lowest percentage of rejections is 72.73%, while at the 10% 
level it is 83.12%. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
The same analysis is performed for the smaller group of economies that 
adopted inflation targets in the early 1990s. For the smaller groups the results 
are similar in nature and provide even stronger support for inflation 
convergence, irrespective of whether or not the countries are classified 
according to the monetary policy regime. As shown in the second panel of 
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Table 2, for the majority of the chosen lags the percentage of rejections is 
100% in all the three groups. 
The validity of the results in Table 2, however, could be questioned. As 
illustrated in the previous section, cross-sectional dependence is likely to bias 
the outcomes. The first step is to test the existence of such dependence. Table 
3 shows the results from the CD-test statistic. In all cases, the null of cross 
section independence is strongly rejected. Note that the dependence is higher 
for the non-targeters. This may be due to the fact that the non-inflation 
targeters group is more homogeneous than the group of inflation targeters. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
In view of the evidence of high dependence among economies, due to 
globalisation in particular, we also investigate the stationarity properties using 
the Pesaran (2007b) testing procedure, which takes into account cross-
sectional dependence. As shown in Table 4, for all the groupings under 
investigation the results suggest that the convergence hypothesis seems to 
hold when cross-sectional dependence is taken on board. However, the 
percentage of rejections of the null of non-convergence still exceeds the 
chosen levels of significance, although lower than those of Table 2. The only 
case where the proportion of rejections is slightly lower than the 5% level 
occurs when the lag order is set at 4 in the non-targeters group of 7 countries. 
 
Table 4 here 
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The application of cross-sectional ADF testing procedure leads to the 
same conclusions as before. The inflation rates seem to have converged both 
among the inflation targeters and non-targeters. Moreover, pairwise 
convergence does not seem to be a phenomenon specific to the countries that 
adopt a common monetary policy regime. The panel unit-root-test results as 
shown in Table 5 confirm this conclusion. The null of unit root (no-
convergence) is rejected by both the IPS and the CIPS tests for all the groups 
under consideration. In all cases both tests give results, which are significant 
at the 1% level.  
 
Table 5 here 
  
Overall, the evidence produced by employing a pairwise testing procedure for 
unit roots Pesaran’ (2007a) and the “cross-sectional IPS” test (Pesaran, 
2007b) point to the same conclusions. Specifically, the empirical results 
strongly support the existence of inflation convergence. But this result applies 
equally to inflation-targeting countries and non-inflation targeting ones. 
Indeed, utilising three different groupings of countries according to whether a 
country has adopted the inflation targeting policy prescription or not, we 
conclude that the usage of inflation targets does not play a significant role in 
explaining the pre-2007 inflation convergence. This finding is in line with the 
literature stressing that it may be difficult to disentangle the effect of inflation 
targeting on inflation rates from other factors. Such factors can be a more 
general process of reforms (e.g. Gertler, 2005) such as central bank 
independence (e.g. Kohn, 2005), the central bank’s communication policy 
(e.g. Mankiw, 2005) globalisation (Angeriz and Arestis, 2007b), and so on. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper examines the behaviour of the inflation rates across inflation-
targeting and non-inflation-targeting countries. In particular, we focus on 
inflation convergence. We draw our attention to potential differences in 
inflation (convergence) performance of countries with different monetary 
policy frameworks. Putting it differently, we investigate whether the inflation 
rates of the countries that have adopted inflation targeting have converged; 
and, most importantly, whether non-inflation targeting countries have had the 
same experience or not. This is undertaken by examining the stationarity 
properties of the inflation differentials of the inflation targeting and the non-
targeting economies, using Pesaran’s (2007a) pairwise testing procedure. 
Moreover, we conduct the same analysis for all the examined economies 
regardless of the introduction or otherwise of inflation targets. Our findings 
indicate that the inflation rates converge within the inflation-targeters group 
as well as within the non-targeters group. In addition, the inflation rates 
converge across the two groups, suggesting that inflation targeting does not 
seem to be associated with different patterns of inflation rate behaviour. This 
finding is in line with the literature stressing the fact that the reduction of the 
inflation rates may not be attributed solely to the adoption of inflation 
targeters.  Instead, the reduction of inflation rates and inflation convergence 
could be the outcome of the coordination implicit in the economic policies 
pursued in a globalized environment rather than that of inflation targeting per 
se. 
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TABLES  
 
Table 1 
 
Selected Countries 
 Wide Group 
Inflation Targeters  
as from the 1990s 
(month/year of adoption) 
Non-targeters 
Australia--(6/1993)  Denmark 
Brazil--(6/1999) Finland 
Canada--(2/1991) France 
Chile--(9-1999) Germany 
Colombia--(10/1999) Ireland 
Guatemala--(1/1991) Italy 
Israel--(6/1992) Japan 
New Zealand--(12/1989) Netherlands 
South Korea--(4/1998) Portugal 
Sweden--(1/1993) Spain 
United Kingdom--(10/1992) United States 
Narrow Group 
Inflation Targeters  
as from the early 1990s 
Non-targeters 
Australia--(6/1993)  Denmark 
Canada--(2/1991) France 
Guatemala--(1/1991) Germany 
Israel--(6/1992) Italy 
New Zealand--(12/1989) Japan 
Sweden--(1/1993) Spain 
United Kingdom--(10/1992) United States 
        Source: Hammond (2012). 
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Table 2 
 
Proportion of differentials for which ADF unit-root is rejected  
 
1-Wide Group  
 Inflation Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 56.36% 87.27% 87.27% 87.27% 74.55% 
α=10% 63.64% 90.91% 89.09% 89.09% 87.27% 
 Non-Targeters  
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 87.27% 100% 100% 100% 96.36% 
α=10% 98.18% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 All 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 72.73% 93.94% 92.64% 91.77% 83.12% 
α=10% 83.12% 96.54% 95.24% 94.81% 92.21% 
2-Narrow Group 
 Inflation Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 71.43% 100% 100% 100% 76.19% 
α=10% 85.71% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 Non-Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 80.95% 100% 100% 100% 95.24% 
α=10% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 All 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 80.22% 100% 100% 100% 85.71% 
α=10% 92.31% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: Each entry shows the percentage rates of rejections of the null hypothesis 0 : 0H    at 
α=5% and α=10% level of statistical significance. The test equation has the form: 
, , , , 1 , ,
0
k
i l t i l t l i l t l t
l
d a d d   

      . 
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Table 3 
 
CD Test for Cross-Sectional Dependence  
 
 Inflation Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
Wide 
Group  
10.30*** 11.92*** 12.33*** 12.25*** 11.15*** 
Narrow 
Group 
6.33*** 5.62*** 5.82*** 6.31*** 7.06*** 
 Non-Targeters  
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
Wide 
Group 
18.46*** 22.52*** 22.60*** 22.38*** 18.20*** 
Narrow 
Group 
13.10*** 12.97*** 12.80*** 13.53*** 13.30*** 
 All 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
Wide 
Group 
30.39*** 34.83*** 36.15*** 34.85*** 34.63*** 
Narrow 
Group 
11.41*** 13.89*** 15.13*** 14.41*** 15.19*** 
Note:. Each entry shows p-values of CD statistic for cross-sectional dependence. Inference is 
based on normal distribution. *** shows rejection of null of independence at 1% level of 
significance. 
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Table 4 
 
Proportion of differentials for which CADF unit-root is rejected  
 
1-Wide Group 
 Inflation Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 23.64% 52.73% 54.55% 61.82% 23.64% 
α=10% 34.55% 70.91% 72.73% 74.55% 30.91% 
 Non-Targeters  
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 16.36% 45.45% 43.64% 43.64% 12.73% 
α=10% 32.73% 63.64% 65.45% 60.0% 25.45% 
 All 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 29.44% 60.61% 59.74% 61.90% 27.27% 
α=10% 43.72% 70.13% 73.16% 71.00% 37.66% 
2-Narrow Group 
 Inflation  Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 76.19% 71.43% 85.71% 80.95% 33.33% 
α=10% 90.48% 90.48% 90.48% 90.48% 38.10% 
 Non-Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 23.81% 33.33% 33.33% 52.38% 4.76% 
α=10% 38.10% 52.38% 52.38% 66.67% 28.57% 
 All 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
α=5% 42.86% 50.55% 57.14% 57.14% 28.57% 
α=10% 48.35% 62.64% 68.13% 70.33% 36.26% 
Note: Each entry shows the percentage rates of rejections of the null hypothesis 0 : 0H    at 
α=5% and α=10% level of statistical significance. The test equation has the form: 
, , 1 1 ,
0
k
i t i i i t i t l t l i t
l
d a d c d d d   

       . 
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Table 5 
 
Values of IPS and CIPS panel unit root tests  
 
1-Wide Group 
 Inflation Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
IPS -5.660*** -14.390*** -12.912*** -13.293*** -7.457*** 
CIPS -3.330*** -3.824*** -3.863*** -3.855*** -2.942*** 
 Non-Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
IPS -8.679*** -13.491*** -14.121*** -15.876*** -8.871*** 
CIPS -2.589*** -3.094*** -3.116*** -3.152*** -2.496*** 
 All 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
IPS -13.921*** -29.456*** -29.132*** -32.051*** -20.082*** 
CIPS -3.300*** -3.794*** -3.861*** -3.783*** -2.945*** 
2-Narrow Wide 
 Inflation Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
IPS -3.883*** -10.123*** -11.779*** -11.688*** -9.303*** 
CIPS -4.138*** -4.712*** -4.207*** -4.000*** -2.938*** 
 Non-Targeters 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
IPS -5.675*** -7.372*** -7.764*** -9.430*** -4.482*** 
CIPS -2.757*** -2.987*** -3.043*** -3.258*** -2.444*** 
 All 
Lag order k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
IPS -9.658*** -19.987*** -21.847*** -23.340*** -17.068*** 
CIPS -3.678*** -3.982*** -4.127*** -3.982*** -2.877*** 
Note: Each entry shows the values of the IPS and CIPS test. For the former test inference is 
based on normal distribution while for the latter Table 2 of Pesaran (2007b) is used.  
*** shows rejection at 1% level of significance. 
